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Abstract 
 
This document describes and evaluates approaches and solutions for firewall issues, such as 
application level gateways, host based firewalls, VPN style gateways etc., which are currently 
available to solve some of the problems Grid applications may face when dealing with firewalls 
located between the source and the destination of their communication paths. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This document presents an overview of existing and upcoming solutions for firewall issues in grid 
environments. It summarizes the requirements on firewalls and tries to match them to appropriate 
sets of solutions. Requirements that can not be covered by any existing solution are analyzed 
further on in this document.  
 
The Firewall Issues Research Group has published in August 2006 a first document [FI-RG-1] 
that collects and classifies the requirements of grid applications in terms of firewall functionalities. 
So far, the following categories have been identified:  
 
1. Some applications need high-throughput data channels; firewalls must be able to cope 
with large amount of data traffic. 
2. Some applications use only a set of well-known ports. 
3. Some applications use a set of well-known ports and a set of detectable dynamic ports. 
Detectable means that through analysis of the traffic between the server and the client it 
is possible to determine which dynamic ports will be used by the applications. 
 
Some applications use a set of well-known ports and a set of obscured (non detectable) dynamic 
ports. “Obscured” means that the analysis of the traffic between the server and the client does not 
provide enough information to determine which dynamic ports will be used by the applications. 
This may happen because the traffic is encrypted or because the necessary information is not 
exchanged at all between server and client. Because of the lack of knowledge, firewalls are not 
able to recognize which data streams (well-known port connections and dynamic port 
connections) belong together. 
 
1. Requirements from document #1 
 
The following requirements have been identified in the first document [FI-RG-1].  
This short summary classifies the requirements into four groups. Every group is described by a 
table holding an identifier for the requirement, a short description, and a severity level of the issue 
(low, medium or high). 
 
1.1 General requirements 
 
ID Requirement Severity Details 
G010 Applications use a single 
port/socket connection for 
simple data transfers 
Medium Using a single (well-known) port allows 
firewall administrators to open only a small 
set of ports and only for a limited number of  
specified servers (minimum uncertainty). 
G020 Grid resources need to be 
protected by firewalls 
High Grid resources have to be considered  as 
any other asset, with the peculiarity of 
being reachable from outside. Moreover 
these resources are often well known by 
outsiders and are appealing for attacks, 
because of large storage capacity, extreme 
computing power and high bandwidth 
connectivity. 
G030 The number of ports needed by 
an application must be 
detectable before, after, and 
during its execution 
High It is always recommended to use well 
formed program structures, so that at any 
time full control and knowledge of the 
status of the running tasks are available. 
Using only well-known ports allows best 
monitoring of communication streams. 
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G040 The network and the 
applications need to deal with 
security policies 
High Applications, that are not aware of security 
issues, should not be allowed to use the 
network. Though a netiquette is well 
known, there are always people which do 
not bother respecting these “hindering” 
rules.  
 
1.2 Requirements on hardware on the communication path  
 
ID Requirement Severity Details 
H010 Routers/Firewalls need to deal 
with high-bandwidth networks 
High Firewalls are usually located at 
ingress/egress points of organizations and 
they have to deal with any kind of traffic: 
both “single streamed” or aggregated. 
H020 The number and type of 
firewalls along a routing path 
need to be known 
Medium Both the number and the kind of hardware 
located within a routing path need to be 
known or the application has to provide 
network relevant info via the path over 
which the communication is taking place.. 
  
1.3 2.3 Requirements for the support of Grid Middleware solutions/protocols  
 
ID Requirements Severity Details 
M010 Support connection from an ephemeral 
(so unknown) port on a client to a grid 
service port on the server 
High To support Globus Toolkit (GT) or 
Unicore 
M020 Support connection from a controllable 
ephemeral (so unknown) port on a 
client to a grid service port on the 
server 
High To support GT 
M030 Support connection from a controllable 
ephemeral (so known)  port on a client 
to a controllable ephemeral (so known)  
port on the server 
Medium To support GT 
M040 Support the usage of internal and 
external service EPRs 
Medium  
M050 Support the usage of ephemeral (so 
unknown) internal EPRs which are 
mapped to external  EPRs 
Medium  
M060 Support ports used by group 
collaboration systems 
Medium  Audio and video ports needed by 
AccessGrid 
 
1.4 2.4 Requirements on Data transfers and storage  
 
ID  Requirements Severity Details 
D010 Use a single socket connection for 
control channels  
High GridFTP control channel, GSIdCap 
for dCache, SRM protocol 
D020 Support the usage of arbitrary numbers 
of sockets (which can vary in time) 
High GridFTP data channels, i.e. 
predefine or signal port usage 
 
1.5 2.5 Requirements on performance and configuration  
 
ID  Requirements Severity Details 
P010 Support high performance network 
links with bandwidth up to 10/40 Gb/s 
High Special applications require high 
speed data connections. Allow a) 
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high speed (single stream), b) load 
balancing or c) firewall bypass 
P020 Support dynamic configuration of 
firewalls by authorized users 
High Define an adequate protocol with 
authentication and authorization 
functionalities or use/misuse existing 
protocols. 
 
2. Solutions 
 
This section describes existing or upcoming solutions which try to solve the requirements listed 
above.  
 
2.1 High speed firewalls 
 
Most of the current high-speed firewalls are able to process up to 5 or 6 Gb/s of data traffic, 
because of the speed limit of their internal CPU and forwarding engines. Often special hardware 
is used to achieve such an high throughput. A market overview of high speed firewalls (as of 
August 2006) can be accessed at the "Internal Reports" web page of Forschungszentrum Jülich 
[D-Grid]." 
 
Current routers could act as a packet filters as far as it fits the needs of the local security policy. 
In this case performance up to tens of Gb/s could be achieved. However only a limited number of 
routers is able to handle the extended access lists required to perform stateful inspection. If 
stateful inspection has to be done a packet filter solution is insufficient.  
 
2.2 Load balancing firewalls  
 
An alternative solution to achieve high rates of firewall throughput is the use of "load balancing" 
configurations. Multiple firewalls can be deployed for scalability and reliability, and simultaneously 
provide balancing of the traffic on inbound and outbound paths. There are different ways to 
realize this idea.  
 
Multiple firewalls are combined into a firewall farm. One firewall is the firewall master and 
delegates traffic to the other firewall slaves. It may use a hashing algorithm based on information 
of the TCP/IP headers to allocate traffic to the slaves. The firewall master uses ICMP-Redirects to 
specify which firewall slave will deal with the incoming packet. The redirect information is sent to 
the routing instance in front of the incoming interface. This algorithm guarantees that routers and 
firewalls of different vendors interact well. In fact with this algorithm single streams are balanced 
rather than the load itself, i.e. a single stream of 10 Gb/s is transferred through one single firewall 
slave.  
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Figure 1: master/slave load balancing controlled via ICMP redirects 
Another approach is based on the usage of a round robin algorithm. Each incoming packet is 
delegated to a different firewall. However, since this is real load balancing and streams are 
distributed across different firewall slaves, new problems arise. First of all an algorithm for packet 
routing has to be defined. Using ICMP-Redirects results in additional load and this leads to 
degradation of the network performance. The introduction of special load balancing devices in 
front and behind the firewall farm could solve this problem. These devices use routing tables and 
exchange routing information. The second problem is the choice between synchronous and 
asynchronous firewall implementations: synchronous firewalls share connection information 
among each other, so that data of a given connection can go through any firewall. Asynchronous 
firewalls do not share connection information and traffic must be revalidated each time it goes 
through a new firewall. Because of the huge amount of state information to be exchanged the 
round robin algorithm is currently not used in any of the firewalls available in the market.  
 
 
Figure 2: load balancing devices 
The use of load balancing devices in front of and behind the firewall is a common approach. 
Although they do not currently use any round robin approach, they use configurable algorithms. 
Some vendors allow the definition of certain hash algorithms and load balancing based on 
session identifiers. Some devices provide also proper handling of protocols like.FTP. However it 
is not sufficient to use such devices as long as they do not fit the performance requirements.  
 
Currently, load balancing is based on hashing algorithms using address and port information from 
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the protocol headers. Though load balancing systems allow the distribution of different streams to 
different firewalls, they do not implement load balancing of one single high-speed data 
connection.  
 
2.3 Dyna-Fire 
 
Dyna-Fire is an extension of the Netfilter iptables software capable of configuring new filtering 
rules in response to valid requests from users' applications. Its main features are:  
 
• The use of Port Knocking as signaling protocol.  
• The storage  in a central database of all users and resources information.  
• The integration with the Globus Gatekeeper.  
 
Port Knocking signaling consists in a client-server communication method in which information is 
encoded in the form of connection attempts to closed ports. The server initially presents no open 
ports to public networks and monitors all connection attempts. A client initiates a connection by 
sending TCP packets carrying SYN flag to a specific sequence of ports. When the server detects 
a valid knock sequence it triggers a server-side process, usually the opening of the requested 
port. The knock sequence may contain additional information such as the IP address of the client 
host, the requested resource (application name or port number), the opening time of the port, and 
a user identifier.  
 
The Dyna-Fire daemon is integrated into the existing network firewall (iptables). In this way it can 
monitor connection attempts from external entities. When it detects a valid knock sequence it tries 
to validate it. If all verification criteria are satisfied Dyna-Fire adds a new filtering rule into the 
iptables firewall. This rule allows access to the destination host and port number only from the IP 
address that sent the knock sequence and only for a length of time corresponding to the validity 
of the user proxy certificate. 
 
Dyna-Fire has been developed at the Center for Computational Research, University at Buffalo, 
New York. Though the current implementation is available only for iptables firewalls, Dyna-Fire 
could be used for any kind of commercial firewalls by integrating additional code into the firewall 
software stack or by analyzing syslog output. Whereas the concept seems promising a closer 
look shows a large overhead in packet flows and confirmation data. Getting one additional open 
port in the firewall requires a lot of signaling (port knocking) packets to be sent to provide the 
desired port, the allowed IP addresses, and user info.  [Dyna-Fire]  
 
2.4 Cooperative On-Demand Opening  
 
CODO is an extension of the Netfilter iptables software capable of configuring new filtering rules 
in response to valid requests from user applications. Its main distinctive features are:  
 
• The use of SSL for the signaling channel.  
• The use of a memory table to register all applications authorized to receive connections 
from the outside.  
• The ability to control both incoming and outgoing connections.  
 
The existing network firewall is integrated with a CODO Firewall Agent. The firewall initially 
presents only three open ports. The CODO agent uses these ports to listen for signaling 
messages: one port is used by internal applications to register themselves as available 
destination entities; another port is used by external applications to request connections to 
internal destination entities; the third port is used by internal applications to request connections 
to external destination entities.  
 
All signaling messages are exchanged over an SSL channel enforcing mutual authentication with 
X.509 digital certificates. The CODO agent defines in its configuration parameters a list of trusted 
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Certification Authorities. Requests coming from external applications are allowed only if the 
destination entities are already registered in the memory table. If all controls are successfully 
passed the CODO agent adds a new filtering rule into the iptables firewall. This rule allows 
access to the destination host and port number only from the IP address and port number 
indicated in the connection request. [CODO] 
 
2.5 Generic Connection Brokering  
 
Generic Connection Brokering enables firewall traversal by decoupling the direction in which 
connections are established between clients and servers. A brokering system arranges which 
party should initiate the communication, based on the network configuration of each party.  
 
In the traditional Berkeley socket system a connection is always established from the client to the 
server, however when the server is placed behind a firewall it usually cannot receive incoming 
connections. GCB implements an intermediate layer between the application software and the 
Berkeley sockets and it reverses the direction of the connection without application's notice. GCB 
broker decides, based on the network situation of the client and the server, who should actively 
connect and arranges accordingly. If neither can connect to the other, because for example they 
are both inside a protected network, both parties connect to the GCB broker and it relays packets 
between them.  
 
GCB requires that applications be linked with GCB libraries. Applications linked against GCB 
should have no change in their behavior until the GCB functionality is specifically enabled. GCB 
aims to provide semantics as close to Berkeley sockets as possible, but some applications will 
require minor modifications to take advantage of GCB's functionality. All connections using GCB 
require contacting the broker, either to negotiate a connection or to use the provided relay (client 
can still directly contact the server, but will not get the firewall traversing capability of GCB). To 
support GCB the function getsockname() must return the IP address of the broker, not the server. 
The server is expected to transmit this address to potential clients using existing advertising 
functionality [GCB-1].  
 
As described above it is possible for a GCB-enabled server hidden behind a firewall to be 
contacted by a non-GCB enabled client. In this case all communications are relayed by the 
broker. GCB requires one or more "brokers" to handle negotiating and relaying connections. All 
machines involved need to be able to make outgoing connections to the broker.  
 
GCB is in use by several groups using Condor's "glide-in" functionality to create dynamic Condor 
pools of hundreds of machines on top of existing grids.  
 
 
Figure : GCB architecture (© http://www.cs.wisc.edu/condor/gcb/basic.html) 
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2.6 UDP Hole Punching 
 
UDP hole punching is a method for establishing bidirectional UDP communications between 
hosts protected by firewalls. It can be used to establish communications across firewalls, by 
means of simulating UDP connections. As a prerequisite to use UDP hole punching firewalls must 
allow outbound TCP and UDP connections.  
 
A relay server, which controls the establishment of a secure communication, has to be installed. 
The server is a central part of this concept. Each client connects to this server using a persistent 
TCP channel. The relay server conveys the public IP address of each client to the other so 
communication between the two can be initiated.  
 
A connection is established through several steps (see Figure 4). The initiator (client A) sends a 
TCP segment to the relay server containing the information that it wants to talk to client B using a 
specific dynamic UDP port. The server notifies client B about client A’s IP address and that it 
expects a UDP connection on this specific port. Client B sends his dynamically generated UDP 
port number also to the relay server and simultaneously sends a UDP datagram from this port to 
the earlier predefined port of client A.  
 
Client B’s local firewall forwards the UDP datagram, stores a connection entry and the dynamic 
access rule which allows responses to traverse the firewall into its internal database. In this 
phase Client A’s local firewall rejects the packet, but this does not matter at all. The relay server 
informs client A via the existing TCP connection to A that client B is accessible on the predefined 
UDP port.  
 
Client A now sends a UDP datagram to B. Client A’s local firewall creates also a dynamic entry in 
its database. However, the dynamic entry in B’s local firewall is still active and valid, so that the 
UDP datagram from A to B passes the firewall. The communication channel is now established, 
despite the static rulesets of each firewall would normally deny inbound connections.  
 
The concept of UDP hole punching can easily be adapted to work also in Grid environments 
[GUDPH]. The relay server is extended to an authentication and authorization service that is 
located inside client B’s domain on a special server or directly onto host B. It listens on a well 
defined TCP port and waits for user connections. At connect time, the remote user and the server 
authenticate each other using X.509 certificates. If the TCP connection between the participants 
has been established UDP data transfers can take place as described in the UDP hole punching 
concept above. 
  
The advantage of an AAA service is obvious. The relay server and client B can be installed on the 
same host, without using an outside relay server that is not administrated by one of the involved 
organizations. Mutual authentication between client and server is necessary only at connect time. 
Once the TCP connection is established data transfers are allowed to start. Furthermore there 
are no problems resulting from NAT. Any server accessible from the public network is exempted 
from the NAT algorithm and the server only sees the public IP address of the client.  
 
The security impact of Grid UDP hole punching depends directly on the secure implementation of 
the AAA service. If authentication and authorization of remote users/processes has been 
programmed with standard and up-to-date security tools, then the dynamic firewall rules can be 
created because access rights to the service have been assigned by the administrator of the 
service. 
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Figure 4 UDP hole punching in Grid environments 
 
Often it is useful to transfer data using multiple parallel connections. The client has to indicate 
how many connections should be used in parallel. It allocates the sockets and sends the port 
numbers to the server. The server reads the information and tries to initiate the maximum number 
of UDP connections available by sending small UDP datagrams to the client. This may depend on 
the system load. The server sends the local UDP port numbers to the client and the client starts 
the data transfers. Starting two TCP connections, one from A to B and one from B to A, is not 
possible, because the firewall recognizes the mismatching TCP sequence numbers and deletes 
the dynamic access entries. 
 
UDP data traffic can be easily encrypted using a simple symmetric algorithm. Because the TCP 
connection between client and server is secured via X.509 certificates the exchange of a shared 
secret could be done via this channel.  
 
Data transfers within Grid applications should be fast and reliable. Because UDP has no three-
way-handshake and no acknowledgement it is faster than TCP, but it is not reliable. Each UDP 
datagram is an instance of its own and the application has to make sure that all the data has 
arrived. In fact this means that Grid applications have to be modified if they want to use UDP as 
the underlying transport layer.. This can be accomplished by the UDP-based Data Transfer 
Protocol (UDT) [UDT06].  
 
UDT uses UDP as transport protocol but it guarantees reliability through an upper layer. Of 
course Grid applications have to be modified also, but the effort is very small because an API 
using UDT can be provided. Only interfaces of subroutines allocating sockets have to be 
changed.  
 
UDT is available as open source and distributed under the LGPL. It is designed and implemented 
by the National Center for Data Mining at the University of Illinois at Chicago. A first internet draft 
has been released in August 2004.  
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2.7 Gateways / Proxies 
 
To securely access Grid resources in networks protected by firewalls, a security proxy for Grid 
Services can be developed. The main aspect of this concept is a security gateway which 
performs content based checks on incoming Grid requests. This is an application level gateway 
(ALG) and it checks SOAP messages of Grid Service requests and decides on the application 
level (OSI level 7) whether the message should pass the gateway or be blocked. In combination 
with packet filtering, provided by usual firewall solutions, and encrypted data transfer methods, 
this allows a shared secured use of Grid resources, separated by security gateways. This can be 
accomplished without major changes to the respective Grid middleware (as Globus or UNICORE) 
and without increasing security risks to an unacceptable level (e.~g., by opening network ports). 
 
Consumer
User handler
Simple verfication handler
Complex verfication handler
Supplier
request
response
E
rr
o
r 
h
an
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Figure 5 Message passing within a gateway 
 
The figure above describes the path a message takes within an gateway. First of all the incoming 
requests have to be accepted by the gateway. The consumer is the instance receiving the 
request. The data arriving here is most likely SSL encrypted. The message is transferred inside 
the gateway system without encryption. An authorization component which is coupled to the local 
security system of the site has to accomplish this task. In the consumer the incoming decrypted 
SOAP messages are parsed. 
 
Next the certificates provided with the request need to be verified. Handlers are provided to 
accomplish this task. A very strict user control can be implemented at this point. It can be 
determined which user is allowed to invoke which service. If the user is allowed to invoke a 
service, the message is passed on to the next step. Otherwise the request is rejected and an 
error message is returned to the client. 
 
The first step within the verification process is the verification of the SOAP message (done in the 
verification handlers).  
 
Within the more complex verification it is possible to check and alter messages. For example 
executables could be scanned for viruses. Messages can be modified in place, e.g. a path to 
executables could be replaced by an alternative path unknown to the user. Even firewalls can be 
open to support GridFTP transfers. 
 
The last step of the verification process is the supplier. It sends the verified messages to the final 
destination. 
 
Within a gateway information about the user and about the network resourced used can be added 
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to the SOAP message. 
  
The gateway can be used to address different security concepts: 
• Using an ALG as Web Service Proxy - Authentication of users with the help of GSI (No 
knowledge about what is actually going on). 
• Validation of all actions taken by users Knowledge about all operations can be gained 
(Accounting, Logging) (Increases latency). 
• Use the gateway as a “firewall opener” - And so support non-blocking buffered I/O (like 
RFT/GridFTP)  
 
2.8 A framework for Token Based Firewalling in Hybrid GMPLS networks - Policy based 
Access Control requirements in GMPLS networks to support Grids  
 
Generalized Multi Protocol Label Switching (GMPLS) is becoming increasingly popular as a 
control plane solution for optical networks working in parallel with a common routed IP network. 
GMPLS deploys a separate data forwarding plane and control plane. The control plane uses the 
ReSerVation Protocol (RSVP), modified to allow Traffic Engineering (TE) as signaling protocol. 
“Token Based Firewalling in Hybrid GMPLS networks” describes an innovation that enhances the 
secure use of GMPLS based networks by creating a firewall function that can sit between a 
routed (connection-less) packet based network and the switched (connection-oriented) GMPLS 
network, which needs protection against unauthorized usage. Tokens will be used to mark the 
authorization of certain IP streams to make use of resources inside a GMPLS network. The 
firewall will route non-authorized IP streams to a transit network.  
 
GMPLS RFC3471  is a generalization of the MPLS architecture RFC3031, which is intended to 
create connections across packet- or cell (ATM) based networks. In MPLS, packets or cells are 
forwarded using labels carried inside the data. Such an approach requires a minimum amount of 
processing during the forwarding process as a label already identifies a path, which is pre-
established by a separate control plane using a signaling protocol called RSVP RFC2205. 
GMPLS removes the requirement for switching devices to be able to recognize packets or cells 
and consequently the requirement to forward data based on label information. As such, GMPLS 
adds capabilities to forward data based on for example time-slot numbers, wavelengths, physical 
ports or Virtual LAN number instead. In order to support signaling for additional classes of 
switching (based on e.g. Time, Wavelengths and Ports) inside the GMPLS control plane, the 
RSVP protocol has been enhanced with Traffic Engineering extensions (RSVP-TE) as defined in 
RFC3473.  
 
 
The basic security mechanisms of MPLS using RSVP signaling are defined in RFC2747. The 
defined mechanisms provide signal message integrity and node authentication. Apart from an 
additional end-to-end security requirement for notification messages, the GMPLS standard itself 
does not impose additional security requirements. Furthermore, the security considerations of 
RSVP-TE in RFC3473 state that the control plane of a GMPLS network must not accept any 
message from nodes that are not known to the recipient to be authorized to make such requests. 
GMPLS was originally designed to serve on-demand requests. Therefore, the information kept at 
each end to maintain a security association, does for example not identify a particular reservation. 
The security association kept between two corresponding nodes using RSVP maintains only 
information about the keys lifetime, the information identifying the sending station and sequence 
number information. Such state may therefore be insufficient to support a more complex set of 
access control requirements, which Grid middleware systems may demand from a GMPLS 
network.  
 
When considering the concept of a GMPLS domain, RFC4726 recognizes that the ingress point 
of a GMPLS domain is a natural point for policy control. In order to assist one or more Grid-(meta-
)scheduler to ensure that assumptions of network availability are accurate, it helps if the ingress 
point can enforce access based on a secured reservation-id. As multiple scheduling agents may 
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reserve network resources, the concept of accepting a ticket or secure token at the ingress point 
of a network has proven to be pragmatic. Many examples of such a system can be found in 
transportation networks such as airline-, train- and bus networks. In our research case, the RSVP 
protocol allows ticket or secure token information to be contained in a POLICY_DATA object as 
described in RFC2750. In this context, we define a secure token as a signed list of attributes, 
where at least one attribute identifies a particular service instance. In order to recognize the 
authenticity and integrity of the token, key material must be shared between the authority issuing 
the right to access the service instance and the network ingress point that enforces the access. 
The authority may be a complex set of middleware functions, which includes a scheduler. As 
such the GMPLS Network ingress point can be considered as a firewall, admitting only an 
Authorized Label Switched Path (ALSP). Figure 5 below shows some basic network elements 
around the concept of a GMPLS firewall. 
 
The GMPLS firewall sits in between a network that connects a GMPLS client. In effect the 
GMPLS firewall acts as a proxy for the GMPLS Ingress LSR to which it would normally connect. 
The GMPLS firewall is connected to the GMPLS Ingress LSR and to the Routed Internet, offering 
transit (i.e. connectivity to the entire Internet). Both the Firewall and GMPLS client are provisioned 
with the proper key material, such that the content of the POLICY_DATA object can be signed by 
the client and recognized by the GMPLS firewall. The content of the POLICY_DATA object is 
dependant on the application, but for scalability reasons it should be minimal. If the content of the 
POLICY_DATA object, acting as a secure token, only refers to some pre-provisioned behaviour, 
that is programmed into the firewall, it has the advantage that the GMPLS client does not have to 
be aware of- or required to handle the associated attributes. The pre-provisioned behavior could 
identify future time-slots, source/destination constraints, route and bandwidth constraints, etc. As 
a minimum the POLICY_DATA object should carry some ID and signature.  
 
 
Figure 6 GMPLS 
 
The above concept is intended to act as a framework describing an approach to use the 
RFC2750 POLICY_DATA object as secure token. Further research needs to be performed to 
identify what attributes should be carried inside the POLICY_DATA object, how key material 
should be distributed and what policies should govern the issuing of the keys, in particular in 
multi-domain GMPLS network scenario’s. 
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3. Matching requirements and solutions 
 
This section provides an overview of which firewall requirements are addressed by the solutions 
previously presented. In the summary table several fields are left blank on purpose when they are 
out of scope for the examined solution. The solutions currently available focus on the following 
categories of problems: 
 
• Use of high-bandwidth network infrastructure  
• Dynamic configuration of firewalls 
• Enforcement of policies for secure data transfers 
  
Name of Solution / ID of 
requirement 
G010 G020 G030 G040 H010 H020 M010 M020 M030 M040 M050 M060 D010 D020 P010 P020 
High speed FWs     N/A       N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A   N/A 
Load Balancing FWs     N/A       N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A   N/A 
Dyna-Fire         N/A                   N/A   
Cooperative On_Demand 
Opening 
        N/A                   N/A   
Generic Connection 
Brokering 
        N/A                   N/A   
UDP hole Punching         N/A                   N/A   
Application Level Gateway 
/ Proxies 
        N/A                   N/A   
Token[RRN1]  Based 
FWing in Hybird GMPLS 
Networks 
        N/A                   N/A   
  
 
This table clearly shows that requirements H020, M040, M050, and D020 are currently not yet 
supported by most of the solutions. These requirements are: 
 
ID  Requirements Severity Details 
H020 The number and type of firewalls along 
a routing path need to be known 
Medium Both the number and the kind of 
hardware located within a routing 
path need to be known or the path 
over which the communication is 
taking place. 
M040 Support the usage of internal and 
external service EPR 
Medium 
 
 
M050 Support the usage of ephemeral (so 
unknown) internal EPRs which are 
mapped to external  EPRs 
Medium 
 
 
D020 Support the usage of arbitrary numbers 
of sockets (which can vary in time) 
High GridFTP data channels, i.e. 
predefine or signal port usage 
 
The requirement that presents the highest severity level is D020. The other requirements come 
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along with the severity medium. This leads to the conclusion that data transfers still suffers from 
major drawbacks when operated in firewalled environments. The mapping of internal Endpoint 
References to external ones also constitutes a problem, especially when using ephemeral (known 
or unknown) ports. Knowledge of the number and type of firewalls (and other network devices) on 
the routing path is very convenient in many occasions, e.g. if you need to debug a grid 
communication problem. 
 
New and upcoming solutions should take into consideration the need of addressing these 
requirements. 
 
4. Summary 
 
The previous chapter described to what extent Grid requirements for Firewalls are satisfied by the 
currently existing solutions. The different solutions might be used on a case-by-case basis, 
having previously analyzed the requirements of the security policy of the individual organizations. 
None of them fit all needs, but most of them have their right to exist. What’s missing up to now is 
a general solution  that fits most of the needs, is simple to implement, highly responsive 
(throughput), globally applicable (standard well known as well as dynamic connections), secure, 
highly recognized (commonly known and implemented) and last but not least standardized.  
 
While this document gives mostly an overview of the requirements and existing solutions some 
issue came up during evaluating the solutions: 
 
• Grid Middleware resources and network resources (like firewalls, routers and load 
balancers) are still two completely seperated layers in Grid environments. 
• Knowledge of the complete communication path would help abstracting network 
resources in a Grid. 
• Support for this kind of network information is not supported by the middlewares 
currently.  
 
Grid Middleware and Network resources management are still complete seperated working fields. 
To resolve many of the issue described in our first document the coupling of these two wokring 
fields becomes necessary. Goal is to make Grid middleware solutions aware of the networking 
resources and vis versa. Therefore protocols and services need to be defined which allow: 
 
• The grid middleware to pass on network information. 
• The grid middleware to alter network configurations (like dynamically open firewalls). 
• The new, to be developed, solution to communicate with network resources. 
 
This working group plans to investigate on this issue in the future. The objective is to design, 
implement, and validate such a solution for Grid environments. 
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3. Glossary 
 
 
AccessGrid 
AccesGrid is a collection of resources and technologies for audio and video 
collaboration between workgroups working apart.   
ALG Application Level Gateway, see chapter 3.3 
Condor 
The goal of the Condor
®
 Project is to develop, implement, deploy, and 
evaluate mechanisms and policies that support High Throughput Computing 
(HTC) on large collections of distributively owned computing resources. 
Guided by both the technological and sociological challenges of such a 
computing environment, the Condor Team has been building software tools 
that enable scientists and engineers to increase their computing throughput.  
(© http://www.cs.wisc.edu/condor/) 
dCap 
dCache native protocol providing access to dataset contents and supporting 
regular file access functionality. The dCache software package includes a C-
language client implementation of this protocol offering the POSIX file I/O 
operations as well as the standard file system namespace operations. 
dCache 
The goal of this project is to provide a system for storing and retrieving huge 
amounts of data, distributed among a large number of heterogenous server 
nodes, under a single virtual filesystem tree with a variety of standard access 
methods. Depending on the Persistency Model, dCache provides methods 
for exchanging data with backend (tertiary) Storage Systems as well as 
space management, pool attraction, dataset replication, hot spot 
determination and recovery from disk or node failures. Connected to a 
tertiary storage system, the cache simulates unlimited direct access storage 
space. 
(© http://www.dcache.org) 
D-Grid 
The German Grid Initiative is a joint research initiative between German 
research and industry funded by the Federal Ministry of Education and 
Research (BMBF)  to develop a distributed, integrated resource platform for 
high-performance computing and related services to enable the processing 
of large amounts of scientific dta and information. 
DMZ 
Demilitarized Zone. DMZ is a firewall configuration for securing local area 
networks (LANs). In a DMZ configuration, most computers on the LAN run 
behind a firewall connected to a public network like the Internet. One or more 
computers also run outside the firewall, in the DMZ. Those computers on the 
outside intercept traffic and broker requests for the rest of the LAN, adding 
an extra layer of protection for computers behind the firewall. Traditional 
DMZs allow computers behind the firewall to initiate requests outbound to the 
DMZ. Computers in the DMZ in turn respond, forward or re-issue requests 
out to the Internet or other public networks. The LAN firewall, though, 
prevents computers in the DMZ from initiating inbound requests.  
Globus Alliance 
The Globus Alliance is an international collaboration that conducts research 
and development to create fundamental Grid technologies. The Grid lets 
people share computing power, databases, and other on-line tools securely 
across corporate, institutional, and geographic boundaries without sacrificing 
local autonomy.  
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(© http://www.globus.org/alliance/) 
Globus Toolkit 
The Globus Toolkit is an open source software toolkit used for building Grid 
systems and applications. It is being developed by the Globus Alliance and 
many others all over the world. A growing number of projects and companies 
are using the Globus Toolkit to unlock the potential of grids for their cause.  
(© http://www.globus.org/) 
GridFTP 
Special FTP protocol for Grids, see chapter 4.2.2 
 
GSI 
Grid Security Infrastructure, the basis for Globus Toolkit Security layer. 
 
GSIdCap 
Extension of the dCap protocol using GSI authentication wrapper (tunnel). 
Communicating with the GSIdCap servers (door nodes) requires opening 
ports into a firewall. 
SOAP 
Simple Object Access Protocol. It is a lightweight protocol intended for 
exchanging structured information in a decentralized, distributed 
environment. It is an XML based protocol that consists of three parts: an 
envelope that defines a framework for describing what is in a message and 
how to process it, a set of encoding rules for expressing instances of 
application-defined datatypes, and a convention for representing remote 
procedure calls and responses. 
SRM 
Storage Resource Manager. This protocol uses HTTPS as transport protocol 
and negotiates data transfers between clients and servers as well as 
between different servers.  
SSL 
Secure Socket Layer is an encryption standard that prevents anyone from 
intercepting and reading the data streams between the clients and servers 
Unicore 
UNICORE (Uniform Interface to Computing Resources) offers a ready-to-run 
Grid system including client and server software. UNICORE makes 
distributed computing and data resources available in a seamless and secure 
way in intranets and the internet. 
(© http://www.unicore.eu) 
WSRF 
The WS-Resource Framework (WSRF) is a set of six Web services 
specifications that define what is termed the WS-Resource approach to 
modeling and managing state in a Web services context. To date, drafts of 
three of these specifications have been released, along with an architecture 
document that motivates and describes the WS-Resource approach to 
modeling stateful resources with Web services. To be released soon are the 
other specifications, an overview document describing the relationship 
among the different specifications, and a document that compares the WS-
Resource Framework with the Open Grid Services Infrastructure.  
(© http://www.globus.org/wsrf/faq.php#wsrf1) 
 
4. Intellectual Property Statement 
 
The OGF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any intellectual property or other 
rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in 
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be 
available; neither does it represent that it has made any effort to identify any such rights.  Copies 
of claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of licenses to be made 
available, or the result of an attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of 
such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this specification can be obtained from the 
OGF Secretariat. 
 
The OGF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent 
applications, or other proprietary rights which may cover technology that may be required to 
practice this recommendation.  Please address the information to the OGF Executive Director. 
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5. Disclaimer 
 
This document and the information contained herein is provided on an “As Is” basis and the OGF 
disclaims all warranties, express or implied, including but not limited to any warranty that the use 
of the information herein will not infringe any rights or any implied warranties of merchantability or 
fitness for a particular purpose. 
 
6. Full Copyright Notice 
 
Copyright (C) Open Grid Forum (2007,2008). All Rights Reserved.  
 
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to others, and derivative works 
that comment on or otherwise explain it or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, 
published and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind, provided that the 
above copyright notice and this paragraph are included on all such copies and derivative works. 
However, this document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing the copyright 
notice or references to the OGF or other organizations, except as needed for the purpose of 
developing Grid Recommendations in which case the procedures for copyrights defined in the 
OGF Document process must be followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than 
English.  
 
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be revoked by the OGF or its 
successors or assignees. 
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